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Introduction 
Paramedic Dawnmarie Souza was fired in 2009 after she called her 
supervisor at American Medical Response a “scumbag” on Facebook.1 
In response, Souza filed a complaint with the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB). American Medical Response justified the 
firing by citing the Facebook post and additionally accusing her of 
unprofessional conduct while on a call.2 The NLRB determined that 
the firing was illegal because her comment came in the context of an 
online discussion about supervisory practices—a discussion protected 
by law. The NLRB found that the employer’s accusations of 
unprofessional conduct “appear[ed] to be pretextual.”3 The case 
settled before reaching an administrative law judge.4 
The result differed in another case dealing with discipline for 
employee criticism of an employer. A BMW dealership fired salesman 
Robert Becker for making two Facebook postings that portrayed the 
 
1. Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, to Jonathan 
B. Kreisberg, Reg’l Dir., Region 34, regarding Am. Med. Response of 
Conn., Inc., Case 34-CA-12576, at 3 (Oct. 5, 2010), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/category/case-number/34-ca-012576. 
2. Id. at 10. 
3. Id. at 11. 
4. Melanie Trottman, Workers Claim Right To Rant on Facebook, Wall 
St. J., Dec. 2, 2011, at B1. 
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dealership unfavorably.5 The administrative law judge determined 
that one posting was protected concerted activity, but the other was 
not.6 Not surprisingly, Becker and the dealership disagreed about 
which post precipitated the firing. The A.L.J. found the dealership’s 
testimony more credible and decided the firing for the unprotected 
activity was lawful.7 But the A.L.J. also found the dealership’s policy 
that “[n]o one should be disrespectful or use profanity or any other 
language which injures the image or reputation of the Dealership” 
unlawfully chilled protected employee conduct, and the NLRB affirmed 
that this policy was facially unlawful.8 
These two examples are part of a larger body of complaints. In 
2011 the NLRB received over one hundred charges from employees 
who were disciplined for criticizing their employers online.9 The 
NLRB determines whether to proceed with these complaints after a 
case-by-case factual analysis, which led one human resources profes-
sional to ask for more guidance, saying the NLRB “comes in and is 
pretty aggressive on these issues, but isn’t really clear on drawing 
lines.”10 
These cases of employers disciplining employees for criticism are 
hard to decide because they require a balancing of interests. 
Employers want loyal employees they can trust and want to avoid the 
damaging fallout that can result from insider criticism. The law 
recognizes the substantial value of employee loyalty.11 Employees, on 
 
5. Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., No. 13-CA-46452, 2011 WL 4499437 (NLRB 
Div. of Judges Sept. 28, 2011), modified by 358 N.L.R.B. 1 (2012). 
6. Id. at *9. In the protected posting, Becker complained about the quality of 
the food the dealership provided for customers at a major sales event. In the 
unprotected post, Becker made light of an incident where a salesperson 
allowed a Land Rover to roll off the lot and into a pond. Id. at *2–3. 
7. Id. at *9. 
8. Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. 1 (2012) (“We  find  the 
‘Courtesy’  rule  unlawful  because  employees would reasonably construe 
its broad prohibition against  ‘disrespectful’  conduct  and  ‘language  
which injures the image or reputation of the Dealership’ as encompassing 
Section  7  activity, such  as  employees’  protected  statements—whether 
to  coworkers,  supervisors, managers,  or  third  parties  who  deal  with  
the  Respondent—that  object  to  their  working  conditions  and  seek 
the support of others in improving them.”). 
9. Trottman, supra note 4. 
10. Id. 
11. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 387 (1958) (“Unless 
otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act 
solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his 
agency.”); cf. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.01 (2006) (“An 
agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all 
matters connected with the agency relationship.”). 
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the other hand, want the freedom to criticize their employers. This 
desire of employees to criticize employers, like the employer desire for 
loyalty, can serve the interests of society as reflected in the legal 
protection of certain employee conduct, such as when employees 
criticize employers while advocating for collective bargaining rights12 
or reporting violations of public policy.13 
Further, a wide variety of institutions and jurisdictions speak on 
this issue, adding complexity the law of employee criticism. Employ-
ment and agency are generally governed by state statutory and 
common law, so fifty sets of state legislatures and courts have 
addressed (or failed to address) the underlying question. Federal 
statutes (and for public employees, the Constitution) apply to certain 
areas of employment law, adding the views of Congress, federal 
courts, and executive agencies to the already clouded picture. 
Despite this murkiness, cases of employees disciplined for criticism 
can be divided into two classifications: those dealing with pretexts or 
mixed motives, and those dealing with disloyalty. In a pretext case, 
the employer puts forward a bogus justification for disciplining the 
employee when the discipline was actually in response to the criticism. 
This is how the NLRB viewed American Medical Response’s 
justification for firing Souza. In a mixed motive case, the employer 
has both legitimate and illegitimate reasons for the discipline. For 
instance, the BMW dealership could legally fire Becker for criticism of 
the dealership’s ineptitude in allowing a Land Rover to roll into a 
pond because this did not relate to a term or condition of 
employment, but Becker’s criticism of low-quality food served to 
customers at an event was legally protected because the dealership’s 
customer service or lack thereof affected Becker’s commissions. 
When employees who have engaged in both protected employer 
criticism and other unprotected conduct challenge the imposition of 
discipline, the seemingly crucial “distinction between a pretext case 
and a dual motive case is sometimes difficult to discern.”14 But this 
 
12. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006) 
(establishing and protecting employees’ right to bargain collectively, 
among other rights). 
13. See Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 39-2-904 (2011) (“A discharge is wrongful . . . if . . . it was in 
retaliation for the employee’s refusal to violate public policy or for 
reporting a violation of public policy . . . .”). 
14. Wright Line, a Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1084 n.5 
(1980), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Wright Line, a Div. of Wright Line, 
Inc., 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981). The Board suggested the difference 
can be better conceptualized by viewing the employer’s justification as 
an affirmative defense: “[I]n a pretext situation, the employer’s affirma-
tive defense of business justification is wholly without merit. If, however, 
the affirmative defense has at least some merit a ‘dual motive’ may exist 
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Note argues that courts and agencies are well equipped to handle such 
cases because courts have a number of tools to determine the 
difference, if any, between the asserted reasons for termination and 
the true reasons. One tool is the burden-shifting approach adopted by 
the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of 
Education v. Doyle.15  
Under the Mt. Healthy test, the initial burden is on the plaintiff 
employee to demonstrate that the employee engaged in legally 
protected conduct that was a “substantial” or “motivating” factor in 
the discipline.16 Then the employer has the opportunity to prove that 
it would have “reached the same decision . . . even in the absence of 
the protected conduct.”17 This approach recognizes “the practical 
reality that the employer is the party with the best access to proof of 
its motivation.”18 And there is the added benefit that under the Mt. 
Healthy test “there is no real need to distinguish between pretext and 
dual motive cases”19—it brings to the fore the actual motivation for 
the discipline whether the asserted motive is wholly without merit, 
meritorious, or somewhere in between. 
This Note argues that the real problem lies with the category of 
employee criticism cases where the decision is based on disloyalty. In 
these cases both the employer and employee agree that the criticism 
motivated the discipline. The employee argues that the criticism is 
protected, but the employer counters by saying that the employee’s 
lack of loyalty deprives the conduct of protection. This Note argues 
that courts are not well placed to determine what disloyalty means, 
and as a result, the decisions focusing on disloyalty are inconsistent. 
Courts should instead focus on whether conduct by employees causes 
actual detriment to the employer. This more concrete standard would 
provide firmer footing for these difficult judicial determinations than 
the dysfunctional standard of employee disloyalty. 
The contours of the law of employee discipline for criticizing 
employers are shaped by its most prominent form, termination, and in 
turn by the at-will employment doctrine. Most employees in this 
country are employed at will, meaning that their employers can fire 
 
and the issue becomes one of the sufficiency of proof necessary for the 
employer’s affirmative defense to be sustained.” Id. 
15. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
16. Id. at 287. The National Labor Relations Board adopted the Mt. Healthy 
test in Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089. In Mt. Healthy the question 
was whether the conduct was protected by the First Amendment. In 
Wright Line the Board dealt with issues of statutory interpretation. 
17. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. 
18. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1088. 
19. Id. at 1083 n.4. 
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them for any reason.20 Termination of at-will employment frequently 
follows after employee criticism of employers. And no firing of an at-
will employee will be wrongful unless it fits into an exception to the 
at-will rule. Therefore, as background, this Note begins with a 
discussion of the at-will employment doctrine. 
Part I addresses the roots of employment law and explores the 
origins of the employment-at-will doctrine and the development of 
some exceptions to the rule. Part II illustrates the difference between 
pretext cases and disloyalty cases. Part III addresses judicial reliance 
on disloyalty in deciding employee criticism cases under the National 
Labor Relations Act. Part IV explains why this reliance is misplaced. 
Finally, Part V suggests that by looking to the pretext cases, courts 
can develop a better methodology for resolving disloyalty cases. 
I. The Roots of Employment Law  
and the Duty of Loyalty 
Employment law in the United States descended from the English 
common law of master and servant.21 There was a presumption in 
English law that, unless otherwise specified, employment contracts 
lasted one year.22 This rule was a reflection of loyalty and fairness in a 
preindustrial, agrarian society23—what Blackstone called “a principle 
of natural equity.”24 It would be unfair for the master to dismiss the 
servant in winter when there was not much work in the fields. 
Likewise, it would be unfair for the servant to be supported by the 
master during the lean months of winter and leave before the heavy 
work of summer.   
The law of employment in the United States diverged sharply from 
the old English rule in the late nineteenth century with the rise of the 
 
20. Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Social Isolation and American Workers: 
Employee Blogging and Legal Reform, 20 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 287, 291 
(2007) (“[M]ost employees in the United States are ‘employees-at-will’—
that is, they can be fired by their employers at any time for essentially 
any reason, or for no reason at all.”). 
21. Benjamin Aaron & Matthew Finkin, The Law of Employee Loyalty in 
the United States, 20 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 321 (1999). 
22. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *425. 
23. Ken Matheny & Marion Crain, Disloyal Workers and the “Un-American” 
Labor Law, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 1705, 1709 (2004). 
24. Blackstone, supra note 22, at *425 (“If the hiring be general, without 
any particular time limited, the law construes it to be a hiring for a 
year; upon a principle of natural equity, that the servant shall serve, 
and the master maintain him, throughout all the revolutions of the 
respective seasons; as well when there is work to be done, as when there 
is not.” (footnote omitted)). 
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employment-at-will doctrine.25 This rule has a “curious history.”26 It 
first appeared in an 1877 treatise by Horace Gray Wood.27 Later 
commentators suggested that case law in 1877 did not support this 
rule, but this is debated.28 Commentators posit that the rule may be 
the “product of the American frontier mentality”29 or “the natural 
offspring of a capitalist economic order”30 or the result of increased 
industrialization.31 Whatever the provenance of the rule, it became the 
clearly established majority rule by the early twentieth century.32 
Under this American Rule of employment at will, an employer 
may terminate an employee at any time for any reason, and an 
employee may leave at any time for any reason.33 Employees are told 
“if you don’t like your employer, don’t criticize or complain—leave.”34 
This strict rule often led to harsh results for employees.35 
 
25. Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 
Am. J. Legal Hist. 118 (1976). 
26. Matheny & Crain, supra note 23, at 1709. 
27. Id. at 1709–10. Wood wrote: “With us the rule is inflexible, that a 
general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the 
servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to 
establish it by proof.” Feinman, supra note 25, at 126 (quoting H.G. 
Wood, Master and Servant § 134 (1877)). 
28. Compare Feinman, supra note 25, at 126 (noting that Wood relied on 
cases that did not support his position, stated incorrectly that no 
American court had recently applied the English rule, and offered no 
policy grounds for the rule), with Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: 
An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment 
At-Will, 59 Mo. L. Rev. 679, 681 (1994) (arguing that seven states had 
adopted the rule by 1877), and Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, 
The Doubtful Provenance of “Wood’s Rule” Revisited, 22 Ariz. St. 
L.J. 551, 554 (1990) (arguing that the four cases cited by Wood 
supported his proposition). 
29. Matheny & Crain, supra note 23, at 1709. 
30. Freed & Polsby, supra note 28, at 558. 
31. But see Morriss, supra note 28, at 681 (refuting the “myth” that the 
rule was the byproduct of increased industrialization). 
32. Matheny & Crain, supra note 23, at 1710. 
33. Id. at 1709. 
34. In this way it is similar to the “Wall Street Rule” that held sway in the 
stock market for much of the last century: “If you don’t like management, 
sell your stock,” and if you don’t sell, vote with management and don’t 
complain. Melvin Aron Eisenberg & James D. Cox, Corporations 
and Other Business Organizations 304 (10th ed. 2011). 
35. See James J. Brudney, Reluctance and Remorse: The Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing in American Employment Law, 32 Comp. Lab. 
L. & Pol’y J. 773, 778 (2011) (“Although employment-at-will has been 
firmly in place for well over a century, state judges in recent decades 
have become more cognizant of the doctrine’s harsh consequences.”); 
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In the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, state courts reacted 
to the harshness of a strict at-will rule and began to fashion common 
law exceptions.36 By 1993, the courts of forty-eight states had created 
significant exceptions to the at-will default rule.37 The three most 
common judicial exceptions are the public policy exception, the 
implied contract exception, and the exception for breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.38 The most significant of these 
in the context of employee criticism is the public policy exception. 
Additionally, there are statutory exceptions, the most prominent of 
which are in the federal National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).39 
Section 7 of the NLRA provides that employees have the right to 
“engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”40 Section 8 makes it “an 
unfair labor practice” for employers to discharge or discipline employees 
who exercise their rights under section 7.41 The NLRA covers a broad 
range of activities and employees.  
II. The Public Policy Exception and the Difference 
Between Pretext and Disloyalty Cases 
The adoption of a “presumption of employment at will effectively 
shielded employers from legal challenges to their termination 
decisions.”42 But this presumption was weakened in many states by 
common law decisions during a period of “intense judicial activity” in 
the 1980s and 1990s.43 During this period, discharged employees 
bringing suits for wrongful discharge were increasingly successful. 
 
Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The 
Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1816, 1844 
(1980) (“This at will rule is based on outdated assumptions and leads to 
unnecessarily harsh results.”). 
36. Brudney, supra note 35, at 778; David J. Walsh & Joshua L. Schwarz, 
State Common Law Wrongful Discharge Doctrines: Up-Date, Refinement, 
and Rationales, 33 Am. Bus. L.J. 645, 655–57 (1996). 
37. Morriss, supra note 28, at 682. 
38. Charles J. Muhl, The Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Three Major 
Exceptions, Bureau of Lab. Stat. Monthly Lab. Rev., Jan. 2001, 
at 3–4, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2001/01/art1full.pdf. 
39. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006); see Aaron & Finkin, supra note 21, at 330 
(describing this method of attacking employment-at-will). 
40. 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
41. Id. § 158. 
42. Walsh & Schwarz, supra note 36, at 646. 
43. Id. at 645. 
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Today, forty-three states recognize a public policy exception to the 
presumption of at-will employment.44 
The public policy exception to at-will employment recognizes that 
employers’ private interests can conflict with the public good.45 One of 
the major rationales for the doctrine is the need to “uphold or 
effectuate legislatively determined public policy.”46 Yet courts made it 
clear that the exception is limited and should not be construed as to 
overwhelm the rule.47  
In the 1980s, the number of courts adopting the public policy 
exception increased dramatically. Before 1980, the courts of only eight 
states had adopted the exception, but by the end of the decade the 
total stood at forty states.48 Between 1983 and 1986 alone, fourteen 
states adopted the doctrine.49 A primary reason for this “snowballing” 
effect was judicial awareness of the trend.50 The doctrine gained 
legitimacy as more states signed on. 
A few states have gone beyond common law and codified the 
public policy exception into statute. One of the first to do so was 
Montana.51 Other states followed.52 Colorado adopted a statute that 
 
44. Id. at 648. Subsequent to the Walsh and Schwarz survey, Ohio also 
recognized the public policy exception. Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 
677 N.E.2d 308, 328–29 (Ohio 1997). 
45. Walsh & Schwarz, supra note 36, at 646. 
46. Id. at 662; see also Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., Local 396, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1959) (“[I]n order to more fully effectuate the state’s declared 
policy against perjury, the civil law, too, must deny the employer his 
generally unlimited right to discharge an employee whose employment is 
for an unspecified duration, when the reason for the dismissal is the 
employee’s refusal to commit perjury. To hold otherwise would be 
without reason and contrary to the spirit of the law.”). 
47. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385 (Ark. 1988) 
(“This is a limited exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. It is 
not meant to protect merely private or proprietary interests.”); Vigil v. 
Arzola, 699 P.2d 613, 619 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (“We do not abrogate 
the at will rule; we only limit its application to those situations where 
the employee’s discharge results from the employer’s violation of a clear 
public policy.”), overruled on other grounds by Chavez v. Manville 
Prods. Corp., 777 P.2d 371 (N.M. 1989). 
48. Walsh & Schwarz, supra note 36, at 656 fig.1. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 663; see also, e.g., Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 
1081, 1089 (Wash. 1984) (“We join the growing majority of jurisdictions 
and recognize a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge if the 
discharge of the employee contravenes a clear mandate of public 
policy.”). 
51. Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-904 (2011) (originally enacted by 1987 Mont. 
Laws ch. 641, § 4) (“A discharge is wrongful . . . if . . . it was in 
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differs from Montana’s in that it protects employees from discharge 
due to lawful activities outside of work.53  
Two Colorado decisions demonstrate the difference between 
“pretext” and “disloyalty” cases. In Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 
the Colorado Supreme Court ordered a trial after finding prima facie 
evidence that the discharge of an employee who criticized his 
employer violated public policy.54 Paul Lorenz was an engineer at 
Martin Marietta responsible for quality control on projects involving 
equipment for NASA’s space shuttle program.55 Lorenz became 
concerned about the lack of proper testing and poor communication 
with NASA engineers.56 When his supervisors did not respond 
favorably to his concerns, Lorenz took his “evaluations and criticisms” 
directly to NASA personnel.57 As a result of Lorenz’s criticisms, 
representatives from Martin Marietta and NASA attended a technical 
review session. Lorenz took minutes of the meeting. Afterwards, 
 
retaliation for the employee’s refusal to violate public policy or for 
reporting a violation of public policy . . . .”). 
52. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1501(A)(3)(b) (2012) (codifying 
the Arizona Supreme Court’s creation of a civil damages remedy for 
employees discharged in violation of an Arizona statute); Minn. Stat. 
Ann. § 181.932, subdiv. 1(1) (West 2012) (prohibiting employers from 
discharging an employee because the employee reported in good faith a 
violation of federal or state law); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 34:19-1 to -14 
(West 2011) (creating a civil action for employees discharged in 
retaliation for disclosing an unlawful policy or practice of the employer). 
But see, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 34-7-1 (2011) (codifying the employment-
at-will doctrine without a statutory public policy exception). 
53. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402.5 (2012): 
(1) It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment practice for an 
employer to terminate the employment of any employee due to 
that employee’s engaging in any lawful activity off the premises 
of the employer during nonworking hours unless such a 
restriction:  
(a) Relates to a bona fide occupational requirement or is 
reasonably and rationally related to the employment activi-
ties and responsibilities of a particular employee or a 
particular group of employees, rather than to all employees 
of the employer; or  
(b) Is necessary to avoid a conflict of interest with any 
responsibilities to the employer or the appearance of such a 
conflict of interest. 
54. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 100 (Colo. 1992) (en 
banc). 
55. Id. at 102. 
56. Id. at 103. 
57. Id. 
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Martin Marietta officials instructed Lorenz to modify the minutes. 
Lorenz refused to do so, and he wrote a memorandum calling the 
changes “not mere corrections but rather . . . retractions of important 
representations made by Martin Marietta officials.”58 His supervisor 
told him to “start playing ball with management.”59 After another 
incident where Lorenz complained that the lack of sufficient testing 
by Martin Marietta “would constitute a fraud on NASA,”60 Lorenz 
was laid off for “lack of work,” even though he was extremely busy at 
the time.61 
Faced with these facts, the Colorado Supreme Court recognized 
for the first time a cause of action for wrongful discharge under the 
public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.62 Lorenz 
alleged that Martin Marietta ordered him to commit fraud on NASA, 
an agency of the United States government, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1001.63 The court said there “is no question” that perpetrating a 
fraud on the federal government is against the public policy of 
Colorado.64 “In light of Colorado’s long-standing rule that a contract 
violative of public policy is unenforceable,” the court found it 
“axiomatic” that termination of an at-will employee “should also be 
deemed unenforceable when violative of public policy.”65 
 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 103–04. 
62. Id. at 108. The Colorado Court of Appeals had previously recognized 
the exception in Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n, 765 P.2d 
619 (Colo. App. 1988). The Lorenz court explicitly approved Cronk 
“with minor modifications.” Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 108. 
63. The statute provides that 
whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, 
legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United 
States, knowingly and willfully— 
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up . . . a material fact; 
(2)  makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent 
statement or representation; or  
(3)  makes or uses any false writing or document knowing 
the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or 
fraudulent statement or entry;  
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years 
. . . or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2006). 
64. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 109. 
65. Id. 
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Because of the posture of the case, the court did not reach a 
decision on the merits. Instead, it decided that Lorenz presented 
enough “evidence at trial to establish a prima facie case for wrongful 
discharge” and ordered a new trial.66 In doing so, the court confirmed 
the elements of the cause of action: (1) an employee plaintiff was 
directed “to perform an illegal act as part of the employee’s work 
related duties or prohibited . . . from performing a public duty or 
exercising an important job-related right or privilege”; (2) the ordered 
action “violate[d] a specific statute relating to the public health, 
safety, or welfare, or . . . undermine[d] a clearly expressed public 
policy”; (3) “the employee was terminated as the result of refusing to 
perform the act directed by the employer”; and (4) the employer 
knew or should have known that the ordered act was illegal or 
contrary to public policy.67 
Lorenz is an example of a pretext case, and it shows how courts 
are able to effectively deal with pretextual employee discipline. Martin 
Marietta claimed it was laying Lorenz off due to “lack of work.”68 
Lorenz argued that this justification was “blatant pretext.”69 Because 
of the posture of the case, the Colorado Supreme Court did not 
determine whether it was pretext, but had it gone to trial on remand, 
the trial court would have taken evidence on the issue of pretext and 
made a determination.70  
Compare Lorenz to Marsh v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., where the 
United States District Court for the District of Colorado determined 
whether a discharge for public criticism violated the Colorado 
wrongful discharge statute.71 Delta Airlines employee Michael Marsh 
was upset with Delta’s decision to replace laid-off employees with 
temporary workers. Marsh wrote a critical letter to the editor of the 
Denver Post,72 and Delta subsequently fired him “for conduct 
unbecoming a Delta employee.”73  
 
66. Id. at 111. 
67. Id. at 109. 
68. Id. at 104. 
69. Answer Brief on Certiorari at 11, Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 
P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992) (No. 90SC583), 1991 WL 11034482 at *11. 
70. Presumably one reason there was no trial on remand is that the 
justification most likely was “blatant pretext.” And, according to 
Lorenz, Martin Marietta “admitted that Lorenz’ [sic] objections to 
design deficiencies was the real reason for his termination.” Id. 
71. Marsh v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1458, 1460 (D. Colo. 1997). 
72. The letter read, in part: 
Delta Air Lines, a company which is renowned worldwide for its 
corporate family culture, enthusiastic and professional employees 
and superior service to customers, has decided to flush 60 years 
[sic] worth of care and paternalism down the executive 
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The court found “an implied duty of loyalty” in the “bona fide 
occupational requirements” of the statute.74 It also rejected Marsh’s 
claim that he was acting as a whistleblower and consequently 
protected under Colorado law. Marsh “was not exposing public safety 
concerns, instead he was [merely] a disgruntled worker venting his 
frustrations.”75 
Marsh is a “disloyalty” case and harder to deal with than Lorenz. 
Loyalty is not mentioned at all in the statute, which instead makes an 
exception for “bona fide occupational requirement[s].”76 From this, the 
court inferred that the statute created a “duty of loyalty, with regard 
to public communications, that employees owe to their employers.”77 
But, except to say that “loyalty” protects companies’ reputations 
from the “indiscriminate public blows” of employees, the court did not 
explain what “loyalty” means. Loyalty is not a legal term of art, and 
relying on this word in judicial decisions is problematic.78 
 
 
washroom toilet, putting thousands of loyal Delta employees and 
their families on hold or in the street. 
The company is convinced it can continue to deliver its 
traditional high levels of customer service with $6 an hour help. 
The thinking here, apparently, is that what works for the fast-
food industry should work for the airline business just as handily.  
. . . . 
In betraying the trust and loyalty of more than 60,000 dedicated 
employees, Delta has lost the very thing that made it so 
prosperous and efficient over six decades. 
And now has come the ultimate insult: Delta employees were 
called together and told that they would be responsible for 
training the cheap contract help that would be replacing them. 
This curious mandate speaks to corporate arrogance and 
ignorance of the first magnitude.  
Id. at 1460–61. 
73. Id. at 1461. 
74. Id. at 1463. 
75. Id. 
76. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402.5(1)(a) (2012). 
77. Marsh, 952 F. Supp. at 1463 (“By providing exceptions to the statute’s 
general rule, the legislature indicated that it did not intend this privacy 
statute to provide a sword to employees thereby allowing employees to 
strike indiscriminate public blows against the business reputation of 
their employer.”). 
78. See infra Part IV. 
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III. Disloyalty Standards Under  
the National Labor Relations Act 
The NLRA protects a broad range of employees and activities. 
While the NLRA is most commonly considered in the context of union 
organizing, the definition of employees under the Act is broad and 
covers most privately employed individuals.79 Covered employees have 
the right to participate in “concerted activities for the purpose of . . . 
mutual aid or protection.”80 The Act shields many concerted activities 
that would otherwise be considered “disloyal.”81 For example, work 
stoppages may be protected, depending on the circumstances.82 
The extent to which disciplining employees’ criticism of employers 
is permissible under the NLRA is muddled. In the leading Supreme 
Court case, known as Jefferson Standard, labor negotiations between 
a television station in Charlotte, North Carolina, and the technicians’ 
union broke down.83 The technicians distributed handbills that 
criticized the station’s lack of live programming and suggested that 
the station considered Charlotte “a second class community.”84 Ten 
 
79. Cynthia L. Estlund, What Do Workers Want? Employer Interests, Public 
Interests, and Freedom of Expression Under the National Labor Relations 
Act, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 921, 922 (1992) (“[S]ection 7 also protects 
employee protest and advocacy unrelated to traditional union activity.”). 
The NLRA defines “employee” as “any employee” except for agricultural 
labors, individuals employed by a parent or spouse, independent 
contractors, and certain railroad employees. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006). 
80. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). 
81. Aaron & Finkin, supra note 21, at 331. 
82. See NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 10 (1962) (enforcing an 
NLRB decision reinstating seven unorganized employees who walked off 
the job because it was too cold in the shop where they were working). 
But see NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 255, 260 
(1939) (refusing to reinstate workers who engaged in a “sit-down strike” 
because they were trespassing on their employer’s property). 
83. NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. Elec. Workers (Jefferson 
Standard), 346 U.S. 464 (1953). 
84. Id. at 468. The handbills read in full as follows: 
IS CHARLOTTE A SECOND-CLASS CITY? 
You might think so from the kind of Television programs being 
presented by the Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co. over 
WBTV. Have you seen one of their television programs lately? 
Did you know that all the programs presented over WBTV are 
on film and may be from one day to five years old. There are no 
local programs presented by WBTV. You cannot receive the 
local baseball games, football games or other local events 
because WBTV does not have the proper equipment to make 
these pickups. Cities like New York, Boston, Philadelphia, [and] 
Washington receive such programs nightly. Why doesn’t the 
Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Company purchase the needed 
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technicians were fired for these handbills. The union challenged the 
firings as an unfair labor practice under the NLRA. 
The Supreme Court focused on whether the technicians were 
discharged “for cause,” which is permitted and not an unfair labor 
practice under the NLRA.85 The Court called the handbills “a vitriolic 
attack” and noted that they did not refer to the labor controversy but 
instead attacked the quality of the company’s service to its custom-
ers.86 The Court noted that Congress did not intend for section 7 to 
“weaken the underlying . . . bonds and loyalties of employer and 
employee”87 and reasoned that “[t]here is no more elemental cause for 
discharge than disloyalty to [one’s] employer.”88 The distribution of 
the handbills was “of such detrimental disloyalty” to the company as 
to justify the firings.89 
The Court thus raised the question of what qualifies as 
“disloyalty.” In dissent, Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Black 
and Douglas, warned that “to float such imprecise notions as 
‘discipline’ and ‘loyalty’ in the context of labor controversies, as the 
basis of a right to discharge, is to open the door wide to individual 
judgment by Board members and judges.”90 Frankfurter worried that 
these imprecise terms would not provide guidance to the lower courts 
and would therefore “needlessly stimulate litigation.”91 Lack of clarity 
was “the near universal judgment of contemporaneous and later 
students of Jefferson Standard.”92 And history proved Justice Frankfur-
ter and the early critics prescient. Subsequent decisions by the lower 
courts and the National Labor Relations Board varied significantly.93 
 
equipment to bring you the same type of programs enjoyed by 
other leading American cities? Could it be that they consider 
Charlotte a second-class community and only entitled to the 
pictures now being presented to them? 
Id. 
85. Id. at 465. 
86. Id. at 468. 
87. Id. at 473. 
88. Id. at 472. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 481 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
91. Id.  
92. Matthew W. Finkin, Disloyalty! Does Jefferson Standard Stalk Still?, 28 
Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 541, 547 (2007). 
93. This phenomenon might be exacerbated by the political nature of the 
NLRB. The five-member Board is appointed by the President to 
staggered five-year terms. After a few years in office, the sitting 
President’s appointees will constitute a majority of the Board, and 
decisions may then reflect the leaning of the party in control of the 
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In Community Hospital of Roanoke Valley, Inc. v. NLRB,94 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit enforced a 
Board decision reinstating a nurse who had been dropped from full-
time employment for “disloyal conduct.”95 The nurse gave a television 
interview in which she criticized the hospital’s staffing levels as well 
as the salary and benefits of nurses.96 Because her statements were 
“directly related to protected concerted activities . . . in progress,” the 
court distinguished the facts from Jefferson Standard and rejected the 
hospital’s assertion that the statements were unprotected.97  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
reached a similar result in NLRB v. New York University Medical 
Center 98—albeit via different reasoning. Several employees handed 
out leaflets to other hospital employees in advance of a union election. 
The leaflets were harshly critical of the hospital, accusing it of turning 
its “security guards into a fascist gestapo illegally searching workers 
and firing them.”99 The hospital suspended several of the employees 
who distributed the leaflets and terminated one. It recognized that 
employees had a general right to distribute leaflets but argued that 
the contents of these specific leaflets were disruptive of discipline and 
“manifested disloyalty to the employer and hence lost all protection 
under the Act.”100 The court found the leafleting was a protected 
activity because the leaflets were aimed at other employees and, 
unlike in Jefferson Standard, they did not disparage the employer’s 
product.101  
 
White House. See Charles T. Goodsell & Ceferina C. Gayo, Appointive 
Control of Federal Regulatory Commissions, 23 Admin. L. Rev. 291  
(1971); see also Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 
1097 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“It is a fact of life in NLRB lore that certain 
substantive provisions of the NLRA invariably fluctuate with the 
changing compositions of the Board.”). 
94. Cmty. Hosp. of Roanoke Valley, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 
1976), enforcing 220 N.L.R.B. 217 (1975). 
95. Cmty. Hosp. of Roanoke Valley, Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 217, 222 (1975). 
96. 538 F.2d at 609. The hospital, when admonishing the nurse, admitted 
that her critical statements may have been true but nevertheless 
complained that “the impression that you created with the public was 
disastrous to the hospital as far as [management] was concerned.” Id. 
97. Id. at 610. 
98. NLRB v. N.Y. Univ. Med. Ctr., 702 F.2d 284 (2d Cir.), vacated, 464 
U.S. 805 (1983), aff’d on remand, 751 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(unpublished table decision). 
99. Id. at 286. 
100. Id. at 289. 
101. Id. at 292. 
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In the first thirty years after Jefferson Standard, lower courts 
thus developed two analyses of criticism that is sufficiently “disloyal” 
to be excluded from section 7 protection. The Community Hospital 
analysis focused on the relationship between the criticism and 
concerted activity. New York University Medical Center focused on 
whether the employee disparaged the employer’s product as opposed 
to criticizing the employer’s labor practices.  
In Sierra Publishing Co. v. NLRB, decided a few years later, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized both 
of these analyses but gave much more weight to the analysis of 
relatedness to concerted activity.102 The court explained that later 
cases “confined” the reach of the disparagement analysis, “and made 
clear that Jefferson Standard was not to be read to equate criticism 
with disloyal product disparagement. Instead, appeals to third parties 
forfeit [section] 7 protection only if their connection to the employees’ 
working conditions is too attenuated.”103 The court also noted that 
“the NLRB has progressively narrowed the areas of activity found to 
be unprotected because of disloyalty.”104 
The dispute in Sierra Publishing arose out of collective bargaining 
negotiations between The Sacramento Union and the Northern 
California Newspaper Guild, which represented most of the paper’s 
nonsupervisory personnel.105 After the two sides were unable to reach 
an agreement, members of the guild’s bargaining committee sent a 
letter to the newspaper’s advertisers. The letter explained that as a 
result of stalled negotiations, the newspaper was “speeding downhill,” 
and the committee asked advertisers to call management to “help us 
save the . . . newspaper.”106 The newspaper then discharged the 
employees responsible for the letter for disloyally disparaging the 
paper. The NLRB ordered reinstatement.107 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the NLRB and enforced the 
decision. Summarizing the law, the court wrote that “the disloyalty 
standard is at base a question of whether the employees’ efforts to 
improve their wages or working conditions through influencing 
strangers to the labor dispute were pursued in a reasonable manner 
 
102. See Sierra Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 217 (9th Cir. 1989), 
enforcing 291 N.L.R.B. 540 (1988) (calling the relatedness analysis 
“central to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Jefferson Standard, and 
. . . the [continued] focus of NLRB and judicial analysis”). 
103. Id. at 216 (citing for this proposition, among others, Cmty. Hosp. of 
Roanoke Valley, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1976)). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 213–14. 
106. Id. at 214. 
107.  Sierra Publ’g Co., 291 N.L.R.B. 540, 550–51 (1988). 
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under the circumstances.”108 Disparaging an employer’s product is 
unreasonable if not connected to a labor dispute, but when the 
employer’s treatment of its employees may negatively affect product 
quality, criticism is likely reasonable.109 Sierra Publishing’s narrow 
and employee-friendly reading of Jefferson Standard diminished the 
force of the Court’s “detrimental disloyalty” standard that had been 
applied since the 1950s. 
In 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit “breathed fresh life into” Jefferson Standard.110 In 
Endicott Interconnect Technologies, Inc. v. NLRB, the court set aside 
the Board’s decision calling for the reinstatement of an employee 
terminated for criticism.111 Endicott Interconnect Technologies (EIT) 
purchased a circuit board manufacturing facility from IBM. Two 
weeks after the sale, EIT laid off ten percent of its new workforce. 
The local paper quoted an EIT employee, Richard White, in an article 
about the downsizing. White told the paper that there were “gaping 
holes” in the company after the layoffs.112 
EIT management accused White of “disparag[ing] the Company 
in violation of the company Handbook” and “threatened to terminate 
[him] if it happened again.”113 A week later White posted a message 
on the newspaper’s public comment forum. White’s pro-union message 
argued that “no one else [but the union] will help” stop “all the bad 
things that IBM and EIT have done to the employees and their 
families and the community at large” and that the “business is being 
tanked by a group of people that have no good ability to manage 
it.”114 EIT management determined that White had “disparaged EIT 
again” and discharged him.115 
The NLRB, in a two-to-one decision, found that White’s state-
ments were protected and ordered his reinstatement.116 The Board 
 
108. Sierra Publ’g, 889 F.2d at 220. 
109. Id. (suggesting that “[p]roduct disparagement unconnected to the labor 
dispute, breach of important confidences, and threats of violence” are 
probably unreasonable, while casting as probably reasonable “suggestions 
that a company’s treatment of its employees may have an effect upon 
the quality of the company’s products, . . . or the company’s own 
viability”). 
110. Finkin, supra note 92, at 541. 
111. Endicott Interconnect Techs., Inc. v. NLRB, 453 F.3d 532, 532 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006). 
112. Id. at 534. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 534–35. 
115. Id. at 535. 
116. Endicott Interconnect Techs., Inc., 345 N.L.R.B. 448, 460 (2005). 
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concluded that White’s statements were connected to a labor dispute 
and therefore “concerted activities” under section 7.117 The statements 
“were ‘not so misleading, inaccurate, or reckless, or otherwise outside 
the bounds of permissible speech, to cause [him] to lose the Act’s 
protection.’ ”118 Citing Jefferson Standard, the Board determined that 
“White’s statements evince no more than the kind of bias and 
hyperbole that the Board has found within the acceptable limits of 
Section 7.”119 
The District of Columbia Circuit disagreed. While accepting the 
Board’s formulation of the Jefferson Standard holding and its 
determination that White’s statements were part of an ongoing labor 
dispute, the court concluded that “the Board misapplied the second 
part of the test.”120 It did not matter that White’s statements were 
not misleading, inaccurate, or reckless because the Board had left one 
attribute off the list—disloyalty. “And White’s communications were 
unquestionably detrimentally disloyal.”121 Therefore White was not 
protected by the NLRA, his discharge was legal, and the Board’s 
decision was vacated. 
The District of Columbia Circuit’s interpretation of Jefferson 
Standard disloyalty conflicts with the interpretation by the Ninth 
Circuit in Sierra Publishing. The Ninth Circuit focused on the 
connection between the criticism and concerted activity. But even 
though the District of Columbia Circuit agreed with the Board’s 
determination that the criticism in Endicott was connected to 
concerted activity,122 it nevertheless vacated White’s reinstatement.123 
The Endicott decision is also at odds with New York University 
Medical Center and other cases that analyze whether the criticism is 
aimed at the employer’s product or its labor practices. In deciding that 
White’s statements were “detrimentally disloyal,” the District of 
Columbia Circuit focused on harm to EIT’s product and customer 
relationships. The court more than once mentioned the adverse reaction 
 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 451 (quoting Titanium Metals Corp., 340 N.L.R.B. 766, 766 n.3 
(2003), enforcement denied on other grounds, 392 F.3d 439 (D.C. Cir. 
2004)). 
119. Id. at 451–52. 
120. Endicott, 453 F.3d at 537. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 535. 
123. Id. at 536 (“[T]he fortuity of the coexistence of a labor dispute affords 
. . . no substantial defense.” (quoting NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, 
Int’l Bhd. Elec. Workers (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 476 
(1953))). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3·2013 
Dysfunctional Disloyalty Standards in Employee Criticism Cases 
935 
of IBM on reading the interview.124 But the court could have just as 
easily said that White was not criticizing EIT’s products, but rather its 
labor practices, namely laying off ten percent of its workforce. Certainly 
other courts would have decided this case the other way.125  
Even the Jefferson Standard Court might have decided Endicott 
differently. The Jefferson Standard Court emphasized that the techni-
cians’ handbills made no reference to any labor dispute. Had the 
handbills done so, the public would have read them with a more 
discerning eye, knowing that the technicians were self-interested.126 
This lack of disclosure was a major reason that the Court found the 
technicians disloyal. In Endicott, there was no doubt that White was 
criticizing labor practices—the newspaper’s article and Internet forum 
were about the layoffs.  
The language Endicott cited from Jefferson Standard—“[t]he 
fortuity of the coexistence of a labor dispute affords . . . no substan-
tial defense”127—has a slightly different meaning when read in its 
original context. In the paragraph immediately preceding this 
sentence, the Jefferson Standard Court described the unrelatedness of 
the criticism in the handbills to the labor dispute.128 The lack of this 
 
124. See id. at 534 (“[IBM] expressed concern over whether EIT had ‘gutted’ 
its engineering staff and as a consequence had ‘gaping holes.’”); id. at 
537 (“The damaging effect of the disloyal statements, made by an 
experienced insider at a time when EIT was struggling to get up and 
running under new management, is obvious from the immediate reaction 
of IBM’s vice president, who telephoned [an EIT official] concerned 
about EIT’s continuing ability to supply IBM’s circuit board needs.”). 
125. See Sierra Publ’g Co. v. NRLB. 889 F.2d 210, 220 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(“[S]uggestions that a company’s treatment of its employees may have 
an effect upon the quality of the company’s products, or may even affect 
the company’s own viability are not likely to be unreasonable, 
particularly in cases when the addressees of the information are made 
aware of the fact that a labor dispute is in progress.”).  
126. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 476–77 (“The only connection between 
the handbill and the labor controversy was an ultimate and undisclosed 
motive on the part of some of the sponsors that, by the hoped-for 
financial pressure, the attack might extract from the company some 
future concession. A disclosure of that motive might have lost more 
public support for the employees than it would have gained, for it would 
have given the handbill more the character of coercion than of collective 
bargaining.”). 
127. Endicott, 453 F.3d at 536 (quoting Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 476). 
128. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 476 (“[The technicians’] attack related 
itself to no labor practice of the company. It made no reference to 
wages, hours or working conditions. The policies attacked were those of 
finance and public relations for which management, not technicians, 
must be responsible. . . . It was a continuing attack, initiated while off 
duty, upon the very interests which the attackers were being paid to 
preserve and develop.”). 
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connection is what makes the existence of a labor dispute fortuitous. 
Had the handbills criticized the wages, hours, or working conditions of 
the company, the labor dispute would not be fortuitous but would be 
the handbills’ obvious raison d’être. The unrelated criticism in 
Jefferson Standard stands in sharp contrast to White’s criticism of 
the layoffs, a labor practice of his employer. In Endicott, the coexist-
ence of a labor dispute was not a mere fortunate happenstance. 
One academic has criticized the District of Columbia Circuit for 
following Jefferson Standard. Professor Matthew Finkin argued that 
the “legal and ideological underpinnings of Jefferson Standard have 
become thoroughly eroded over the ensuing half century; that, at 
best, disloyalty is a worthless guide to decision; at worst, it chills 
speech of social value, and ought to be abandoned.”129 According to 
Finkin, developments in the jurisprudence of public employee free 
speech have changed the employment law landscape.130 For example, 
starting with Pickering v. Board of Education,131 the duty of loyalty 
not to criticize one’s employer “abutted freedom of speech.”132 At least 
when dealing with matters of “legitimate public concern,” public 
employees could criticize their public employer.133 Finkin also noted 
the changes that have occurred since 1953 in common law tort 
doctrine—“that an employee in the private sector publicly criticizes 
her company’s product or management can no longer be said to be 
such an act of disloyalty as to warrant discharge per se.”134  
IV. The Problem of Reliance on “Disloyalty” 
The passage of time has confirmed the accuracy of Justice 
Frankfurter’s warning that “the courts of appeals [would] hardly find 
guidance” from Jefferson Standard.135 Attempting to rely on the 
“imprecise notion[ ]”136 of disloyalty led the circuit courts to develop 
at least four different analyses. The Fourth Circuit found that  
129. Finkin, supra note 92, at 541. 
130. See id. at 551–53 (“[N]o longer do we see an employee’s public utterance 
critical of the quality of her employer’s management or service as an 
egregious breach of the duty of loyalty, we see it today as an act of 
responsible citizenship that contributes to a constitutionally valued 
robust debate on matters of legitimate public concern whatever the 
potential impact on the employer’s ‘bottom line.’”). 
131. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968). 
132. Finkin, supra note 92, at 551. 
133. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571. 
134. Finkin, supra note 92, at 553–54. 
135. NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. Elec. Workers (Jefferson 
Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 481 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
136. Id. 
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criticism “directly related to protected concerted activities” was not 
disloyal.137 The Second Circuit found that criticism that was “directed 
at fellow employees” and did not “publicly disparage the employer’s 
product” was not disloyal.138 The Ninth Circuit distanced itself from 
the disparagement analysis and instead adopted a reasonableness 
standard.139 And the District of Columbia Circuit returned full-circle 
to Jefferson Standard by deciding that “disloyal, disparaging and 
injurious . . . attacks” lose protection without further qualification or 
analysis.140 And, while not interpreting the NLRA or Jefferson 
Standard, the Colorado District Court relied on loyalty to prevent 
what it considered the “indiscriminate public blows” of an 
employee.141 
The reason these decisions are problematic is that “loyalty” and 
“disloyalty” are not legal terms of art. Dictionaries are of no avail.142 
Nor does Justice Cardozo’s famous formulation of “finest loyalty”—
“[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most 
sensitive”143—help to resolve these cases. The Restatement of Agency 
is somewhat more precise, explaining in a comment that an “agent is  
. . . under a duty not to act or speak disloyally in matters which are 
connected with his employment except in the protection of his own 
interests or those of others.”144 But even this only describes the 
situation; it does not give guidance on how to resolve it. 
One could conceive of the employment-at-will doctrine as placing 
an obligation on employees not to act or speak disloyally, as disloyalty 
saps the will to employ and may lead to termination. But the common 
law public policy exception, the Colorado statute, and the NLRA 
recognize interests that an employee can protect—the right to speak 
out when the employer violates the law, the right to participate in 
lawful activities outside the workplace, and the right to engage in con-
 
137. Cmty. Hosp. of Roanoke Valley, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 607, 610 
(1975). 
138. NLRB v. N.Y. Univ. Med. Ctr., 702 F.2d 284, 292 (2d Cir.), vacated, 
464 U.S. 804 (1983), aff’d on remand, 751 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(unpublished table decision). 
139. Sierra Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 216, 220 (9th Cir. 1989). 
140. Endicott Interconnect Techs., Inc. v. NLRB, 453 F.3d 532, 537 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006). 
141. Marsh v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1458, 1463 (D. Colo. 1997). 
142. Compare Black’s Law Dictionary 1033 (9th ed. 2009) (defining 
loyalty as “[f]aithfulness or allegiance to a person, cause, duty, or 
government”), with Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary 1342 (1986) (defining loyalty as “fidelity or tenacious 
adherence (as to a government, principle, practice, or custom)”). 
143. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
144. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 387 cmt. b (1958). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3·2013 
Dysfunctional Disloyalty Standards in Employee Criticism Cases 
938 
certed action. Sometimes, as recognized by the Restatement comment, 
protecting these interests requires an employee to speak disloyally. 
The Jefferson Standard Court recognized that while the NLRA 
protects some conduct or speech that would otherwise be considered 
disloyal,145 there comes a point where disloyalty crosses the line, 
becomes “detrimental,”146 and thus justifies dismissal “for cause” 
under section 10.147 The problem posed by this and similar cases is 
locating that line. As Justice Frankfurter explained, “ ‘Concerted 
activities’ by employees and dismissal ‘for cause’ by employers are not 
dissociated legal criteria under the Act. They are like the two halves 
of a pair of shears.”148 Using this analogy, it is the job of courts to 
determine where the shears meet the paper.  
The problem with courts relying on “disloyalty” is not in defining 
the word, but rather in using the word to define this boundary.149 
Employing such a sweeping and imprecise term “open[s] the door wide 
to individual judgment by Board members and judges.”150 It simply 
does not enable consistent judicial resolution. 
Moreover, equating criticism with disloyalty is a mistake. If your 
company is doing things you disagree with, is it more loyal to quit 
your job or to stay and advocate for change? Economist Albert 
Hirschman defined loyalty as “[t]he reluctance to exit in spite of 
disagreement with the organization of which one is a member.”151 
Michael Marsh and Richard White did not want to hurt their compa-
nies. Marsh was concerned that the quality of customer service at 
Delta would decrease if experienced employees were replaced by 
temporary workers. White worried that the layoffs at EIT would hurt 
the company in the long run. They did not want to leave, and they 
fought hard to reclaim their jobs when discharged. Under Hirschman’s 
 
145. See NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. Elec. Workers (Jefferson 
Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 479–80 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(“Many of the legally recognized tactics and weapons of labor would 
readily be condemned for ‘disloyalty’ were they employed between man 
and man in friendly personal relations.”). 
146. Id. at 472 (majority opinion). 
147. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006) (“No order of the Board shall require the 
reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended 
or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual 
was suspended or discharged for cause.”). 
148. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 480 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
149. Another problem with courts employing a “disloyalty” standard is the 
strong emotions it conjures up. Few faults are as reviled as disloyalty: 
Dante reserved the center of hell for those guilty of treachery and names 
like Benedict Arnold and Vidkun Quisling have entered the lexicon. 
150. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 481 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
151. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 98 (1970). 
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definition, their criticisms were manifestations of loyalty, not 
disloyalty. 
V. An Objective, Burden-Shifting Solution 
Courts should take a lesson from what they are able to do well: 
place the burden on the parties to bring forward evidence to 
substantiate their factual claims. This is what courts do in the pretext 
and mixed motive contexts, and they could also do so in the 
disloyalty context. This Part examines how cases addressing discipline 
of employees who criticize employers can be more effectively resolved 
under this burden-shifting framework. 
The Jefferson Standard Court held that the conduct of the 
technicians—passing out the critical flyers—removed them from the 
protection of the NLRA because it manifested “detrimental 
disloyalty.”152 And while “disloyalty” is not a standard that courts are 
well positioned to determine, the same is not true for “detrimental.” If 
prompted, the parties could have presented evidence on whether the 
actions of the technicians actually were detrimental to the television 
station. Justice Frankfurter called for this type of inquiry in his 
dissent: “[O]n a remand the Board could properly be asked to leave 
no doubt whether the technicians, in distributing the handbills, were, 
so far as the public could tell, on a frolic of their own . . . .”153 
This type of inquiry would provide a more concrete basis for 
judicial determination, but courts should go further and utilize the 
additional tool of burden shifting. Evidence about whether employee 
criticism has actually impaired the employer is likely to be in the 
hands of the employer. This parallels the situations in Mt. Healthy, 
where the school was the party with knowledge of what actually 
motivated the teacher’s firing,154 and Wright Line, where only the 
employer knew whether it was the employee’s union activities or 
alleged timesheet falsification that led to the firing.155 The Court has 
employed similar burden-shifting approaches in other work-related 
cases.156 It would be effective here as well. 
 
152. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 472 (majority opinion). 
153. Id. at 481 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
154. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 
(1977). 
155. Wright Line, a Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1088 
(1980) (noting “the practical reality that the employer is the party with 
the best access to proof of its motivation”), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. 
Wright Line, a Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981). 
156. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252, 270–71 n.21 (1977) (noting in a rezoning case that proof of an 
impermissible racial motivation would have “shifted to the Village the 
burden of establishing that the same decision would have resulted even 
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Although the Second Circuit did not explicitly employ burden 
shifting in NLRB v. New York University Medical Center, the court 
did analyze the content of the criticism to determine if it had been 
detrimental. The employees’ leaflets accused the hospital of using 
gestapo tactics.157 The hospital argued that this “provocative 
language” was “disruptive of discipline.”158 The court recognized the 
need to “determine if the language in the leaflets was likely to 
produce misconduct or generally disrupt discipline.”159 But the 
hospital did not “produce[ ] any evidence that it had a reasonable 
expectation that misconduct would ensue,”160 and the court held “that 
substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that the 
objectionable language in the leaflets posed no danger of breach of 
employee discipline.”161 The Second Circuit’s analysis demonstrates 
that this approach is practical and effective. This approach is further 
supported by the decisions of other courts that have analyzed the 
critical language for detrimental effects on the employer.162  
 
had the impermissible purpose not been considered”); McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (requiring employers 
in Title VII civil rights actions to show a legitimate business reason for 
disciplining an employee once the employee has established a prima facie 
case of discrimination); NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 
34 (1967) (“[O]nce it has been proved that the employer engaged in 
discriminatory conduct which could have adversely affected employee 
rights to some extent, the burden is upon the employer to establish that 
he was motivated by legitimate objectives since proof of motivation is 
most accessible to him.”). 
157. NLRB v. N.Y. Univ. Med. Ctr., 702 F.2d 284, 286 (2d Cir.), vacated, 
464 U.S. 804 (1983), aff’d on remand, 751 F.2d 370 (2d. Cir. 1984) 
(unpublished table decision). 
158. Id. at 289. 
159. Id. at 290. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 291. 
162. See, e.g., NLRB v. Owners Maint. Corp., 581 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1978) 
(analyzing leaflets for disparagement, “deliberate or reckless untruths,” 
and violence); Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 544 F.2d 320, 329 
(7th Cir. 1976) (“[C]ommunications occurring during the course of 
otherwise protected activity remain likewise protected unless found to 
be ‘so violent or of such serious character as to render the employee 
unfit for further service.’” (quoting NLRB v. Ill. Tool Works, 153 F.2d 
811, 816 (7th Cir. 1946))); cf. Md. Drydock Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 538, 
541 (4th Cir. 1950) (“The right of the company to prohibit the 
distribution of insulting and defamatory literature must necessarily 
depend upon the character of the literature itself and the effect which it 
might normally be expected to produce, not upon ex post facto proof of 
the results which actually flowed from its distribution.”). 
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This method also illustrates the problem in Endicott Interconnect 
Technologies. The District of Columbia Circuit called White’s 
communications “unquestionably detrimentally disloyal,”163 but it is 
not clear exactly what the detriment was. The court focused on the 
concerned phone call from IBM, the company’s main customer, and 
suggested that the “damaging effect . . . is obvious.”164 But a 
customer’s call or concern is not any more “unquestionable” or 
“obvious” in this context than it would be in the context of clearly 
protected concerted action such as a strike. It is not hard to imagine 
that IBM would have been more concerned and perhaps would have 
called EIT or even shifted its business elsewhere had it received word 
of a strike at the plant.165 
One possible criticism of the suggested approach is that it just 
moves the line. Under a “detrimental” standard, courts will still have 
to determine just how much detriment is necessary to cause the 
criticism to be unprotected. In Endicott, the District of Columbia 
Circuit thought a nervous telephone conversation with a customer 
was enough detriment. But the Ninth Circuit recognized that not all 
economic harm is sufficient to justify removing otherwise protected 
employee conduct from the aegis of the NLRA, and instead focused on 
the reasonableness of the means under the circumstances.  
The truth is that no clear, bright line can be drawn to solve these 
cases. Each case must be examined on its own facts.166 But while this 
is the reality facing courts, detriment is a more concrete and 
determinable standard than disloyalty. Unlike disloyalty inquiries that 
focus on the subjective, detriment to the employer may be shown 
objectively. And since the employer is typically the party with the 
best access to evidence of objective detriment, the employer should 
bear the burden of producing evidence of detriment when challenged 
for disciplining an employee for criticism. 
The objectivity of the detriment standard not only serves to 
protect employees and facilitate adjudication, but it also greatly 
enhances the disciplinary process for employers. When faced with an 
employee’s disparaging Facebook posting, employers face uncertainty 
 
163. Endicott Interconnect Techs., Inc. v. NLRB, 453 F.3d 532, 537 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006). 
164. Id. 
165. See Sierra Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 220 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The 
mere fact that economic pressure may be brought to bear on one side or 
the other is not determinative, even if some economic harm is actually 
suffered. The proper focus must be the manner by which that harm is 
brought about.”). 
166. See id. (“Each situation must be examined on its own facts, but with an 
understanding that the law does favor a robust exchange of 
viewpoints.”). 
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in the legality of a disciplinary response under the disloyalty 
standard. The employer has no objective indicia of the elements of 
disloyalty. While employers can respond to this uncertainty by erring 
on the side of not disciplining employees, this approach leaves them 
open to the very “indiscriminate public blows” of employee criticism 
that the disloyalty standard is designed to shield from employers.167  
The disciplinary process for employers facing employee criticism is 
better off if the standard for discipline of employees who criticize 
employers is based on whether the criticism causes a detriment to the 
employers business. The employer can investigate the conduct and its 
consequences to determine whether the employer has been harmed, 
looking for evidence of detriment. If the employer finds no such 
evidence, the employer saves face by not responding to the harmless 
criticism. If the employer finds substantial evidence of detriment, the 
legality of discipline is more certain, and it may be imposed with far 
less anxiety than the employer would face under the subjective 
disloyalty standard. 
In this way, the solution serves the interests of both employers 
and employees. Detriment is a better line to fight on than disloyalty 
because the inquiry is objective. It carves out for legal protection 
harmless criticism. And when handbills, leaflets, speeches, and 
Facebook posts are directed at improving the terms and conditions of 
employment, the evident self-interested nature of the criticism shields 
the employer from harm that is not a consequence of labor practices. 
Conclusion 
Employee criticism raises conflicting social values: the need for 
employers to have loyal workers who do not undermine the company 
and the need for employees to speak critically when the employer’s 
practices are inappropriate. While loyalty is an important value, it is 
a poor standard for judicial resolution. “Disloyalty” does not provide 
courts with a consistent yardstick, but opens the door to the 
individual judgment of judges. Instead of relying on disloyalty, courts 
should examine whether the criticism was detrimental to the 
employer. And courts should assign to the employer the burden of 
proving that the employee’s criticism caused the harm. 
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167. Marsh v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1458, 1463 (D. Colo. 1997). 
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